Complete CV in PDF
Van Wolferen, J., Inbar, Y., & Zeelenberg, M. (2013) Magical thinking in predictions of negative events: Evidence for tempting fate but not for a protection effect. Judgment and Decision Making, 8, 45-54. (link and post)
(Three rather direct failures to replicate a protection effect reported in Study 1 of Tykocinski (2008) where a reminder of insurance lead people to believe that health-related risks were less likely. Two conceptual replications also do not provide evidence for the protection effect, but we do find a tempting fate effect).
(Overview of empirical work on ex ante and ex post moral hazard, and insurance fraud. We suggest that insurance companies need to save more data and run experiments in order to answer important questions such as: ‘Does insurance induce risk-seeking?’, ‘When and why do people commit insurance fraud?’, ‘What is the price elasticity of demand for health care in the Netherlands’.)
IJzerman, H., Brandt, M.J., & van Wolferen, J. (in press). Rejoice! In replication. European Journal of Personality. (link)
(Commentary on ‘Recommendations for increasing replicability in psychology‘ (Asendorf et al., 2012) in which we highlight the importance of replication for theoretical innovation, determination of true effect-size, and detection of published Type-I errors.)
van Wolferen, J., Inbar, Y., & Zeelenberg, M. (submitted). Incomplete understanding of insurance facilitates fraud acceptance. (see p.25 of SJDM program)
(People think about insurance in a way that is conducive to fraud. Specifically, they feel that if they don’t use their insurance, the money they spent on premiums is wasted, which leads to increased perceived acceptability of fraud. Reminding people of how much insurance costs therefore also increases perceived acceptability of fraud.)
van Wolferen, J., Van de Calseyde, P. P. F. M., Inbar, Y., & Zeelenberg, M. (in prep). Moral hazard: not having insurance makes people careful.
(In several studies we find that people become more careful when they are explicitly aware of the fact that they do not have insurance. Moral hazard seems to be driven by carefulness on behalf of the uninsured rather than recklessness on behalf of the insured.)
van Osch, Y.M.J., Blanken, I., Meijs, M.H.J., & van Wolferen, J. (submitted) The cheerleader-effect: a group of women is more attractive than the average attractiveness of the women in that group. (see parallel session A3 in the ASPO program)
(The attractiveness of a group of women as a whole is greater than the average attractiveness of the women in the group. We test why this effect occurs).
Van Wolferen, J., Inbar, Y., & Zeelenberg, M. (in prep). Good students insure themselves against failure.
(Students who took a stats course could obtain an insurance against a failing grade. We test what type of selection occurs and find data that are most consistent with propitious selection, not adverse selection).
van Wolferen, J. & Schwartz, B. (2013). Practical Wisdom: Mogen mensen naar eigen inzicht handelen? ? Oral presentation at the annual meeting of the Dutch Association for Social Psychology (ASPO), in Maastricht, the Netherlands.
van Wolferen, J., Zeelenberg, M., & Inbar, Y. (2013). Moral hazard: Risk taking or carefulness? Poster presentation at annual meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making in Toronto, Canada.
van Wolferen, J., Inbar, Y., & Zeelenberg, M. Three things that make insurance fraud seem acceptable: Deductibles, insurance companies’ profit, and paying premiums. Poster presentation at SPUDM24, August 2013.
van Wolferen, J., Inbar, Y., & Zeelenberg, M. Moral hazard in the insurance industry: We need more data. Oral presentation at Netspar meeting: Sensible and less sensible choices of pension consumers, March 2013.
van Wolferen, J., Inbar, Y., & Zeelenberg, M. Verzekeringsfraude: Ik betaal toch niet voor niets zoveel premie? Oral presentation at ASPO, 2012.
van Osch, Y.M.J., Blanken, I., Meijs, M.H.J., & van Wolferen, J. The
cheerleader-effect: a group of women is more attractive than the average
attractiveness of the women in that group. Oral presenation at ASPO, 2012
van Wolferen, J., Inbar, Y., & Zeelenberg, M. Insurance fraud: I paid so they owe me. Oral presentation at SJDM, 2012.
van Wolferen, J., Zeelenberg, M., & Inbar, Y. Ex ante moral hazard: people become more risk-averse when they know that they are NOT insured. Poster presented by Yoel Inbar at JDM pre-conference (SPSP).
van Wolferen, J., Zeelenberg, M., & Inbar, Y. Ex ante moral hazard: The uninsured make all the difference. Poster presentation at SJDM, 2011.
van Wolferen, J., Zeelenberg, M., & Inbar, Y. Experimentally challenging the traditional view on ex ante moral hazard: The story of the uninsured. Oral presentation at SPUDM23, 2011.
van Wolferen, J., & Zeelenberg, M. Ex ante moral hazard: Increased or decreased risk taking? Oral presentation at the Behavioural Finance and Economic Psychology: Recent Developments, 2011.
RELEVANT ACADEMIC ACTIVITIES
Spent two months at the OPIM department at the Wharton Business School in Philadelhia, PA (Sept-Oct 2012) visiting Yoel Inbar and Uri Simonsohn. Also visited George Loewenstein at the Social and Decision Sciences deparment at CMU in Pittsburgh, PA for a week.
Best Poster Award at the Summer Institute on Bounded Rationality: Decision Making in a Social World (2013). Awarded by Gerd Gigerenzer and Ralph Hertwig. For ‘Insurance fraud: I paid so they owe me’ project described above.
Dancker Daamen best-paper award, €250 (ASPO, 2012). For ‘Insurance fraud: I paid so they owe me’ project described above.
Netspar Panel Paper, €10.000 for: Van Wolferen, J., Inbar, Y., & Zeelenberg, M. (2013) Moral hazard in the insurance industry. Netspar Panel Paper, #33, 1-73.
LINKS TO OTHER PAGES